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ABSTRACT
Within Anglophone evangelical theology and church life there has been 
much debate in recent months over the idea of ‘eternal functional sub-
ordination’ (EFS) or ‘eternal relationships of authority and submission’ 
(ERAS). To ask whether EFS/ERAS are adequately trinitarian we must 
first define ‘trinitarian’. Following Barnes, I argue that the only possible 
definition is historical. To be ‘trinitarian’ is to hold to the doctrine devel-
oped in the fourth-century debates. By insisting on a strong distinction 
between the divine life in se and the economic acts of God, I rule out any 
appeal to, for instance, the pactum salutis in an attempt to defend EFS/
ERAS. A consideration of the Father-Son relationship suggests two pos-
sible defences of such positions, one relying on finding an eternal ana-
logue to the economic ordering of the divine acts, and the other pressing 
‘Father-Son’ language to suggest that the relationship of eternal genera-
tion might entail something like EFS/ERAS. An examination of what 
must be said concerning the simple divine essence, however, excludes 
both these possibilities. I argue, therefore, that EFS, ERAS, or any similar 
doctrines are incompatible with classical trinitarianism.
INTRODUCTION
There has been considerable energy in Anglophone evangelical theol-
ogy in recent years devoted to the ideas of ‘eternal functional subordina-
tion’ (EFS) or ‘eternal relationships of authority and submission’ (ERAS). 
Alongside a number of book-length engagements,1 there have been many 
1 To sample, merely: Kevin Giles, The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doc-
trine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downers Grove: IVP, 
2002); Giles, Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine 
of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2006); Millard J. Erickson, Who’s 
Tampering with the Trinity? An Assessment of the Subordination Debate 
(Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2009); Dennis Jowers and H. Wayne House (eds), The 
New Evangelical Subordinationism? God the Father and God the Son (Eugene: 
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conference papers and, in the summer of 2016, a whirlwind of blog posts. 
The debate has been highly charged, with accusations of heresy being 
freely thrown on every side; it has its origins in an attempt to link a par-
ticular account of gender roles with the doctrine of the Trinity, through a 
leveraging of 1 Corinthians 11:3.
Whatever the merits of the appeal to that particular pauline text, 
and so of the argument about gender roles,2 the claims about trinitarian 
doctrine are interesting. Both sides of the (regularly acrimonious) debate 
are apparently convinced that there is a relatively monolithic tradition of 
trinitarian orthodoxy that supports their position. I have argued before 
that, historically, the church’s teaching on the trinity has been remark-
ably unified;3 assuming that argument was right, which side (if either) of 
this contemporary evangelical debate can claim fidelity to that heritage? 
I argue in what follows that there is no possible space for EFS/ERAS in 
classical trinitarianism; any such doctrine will necessarily be a departure 
from that tradition.
DEFINING ‘TRINITARIAN’
The confessional basis of the American Evangelical Theological Society,4 
like many other symbolic documents, includes a clause about the doc-
trine of the Trinity: ‘God is a Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each 
an uncreated person, one in essence, equal in power and glory.’ I reflect 
that this is not particularly well drafted: in particular, the natural gram-
matical reading of ‘one in essence’ is that it refers to the immediately 
prior subject, and so insists that each person is one in essence, which is 
rather unfortunate. Grammar aside, though, we can ask about theology: 
how adequate a definition of the doctrine of the Trinity is this? There are 
two parts to this (my qualms about drafting aside): there is clearly noth-
ing here that is repugnant to trinitarian orthodoxy; but is believing this 
Pickwick, 2012); Bruce A. Ware and John Starke (eds), One God in Three Per-
sons: Unity of Essence, Distinction of Persons, Implications for Life (Wheaton: 
Crossway, 2016)
2 I hold fairly strongly to the view that there are no good arguments from the 
doctrine of the Trinity to any human sociality, including gender roles in mar-
riage or church, but that is not the theme of this essay.
3 See Stephen R. Holmes, The Holy Trinity: Understanding God’s Life  (Milton 
Keynes: Paternoster, 2012).
4 This paper was originally written for the 2016 ETS Conference, at the invita-
tion of the Theology and Gender group. I am grateful for the invitation, and 
for helpful discussion at the conference.
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clause sufficient to trinitarian orthodoxy? Or does one need to believe not 
only this but something more to be adequately trinitarian?
Asking such questions highlights that the word ‘trinitarian’ demands 
definition, and the first point I want to make is that the only possible 
definition it may gain is historical. Scripture teaches us much about the 
nature of deity, and about the relationships of the Son to the Father, and 
so on, and of course we should believe all these things. But Scripture does 
not define for us the word ‘trinitarian’—the word is not a biblical one.
Now, of course, we could define the word by asserting that ‘trinitar-
ian’ means ‘believing that which the Bible teaches about Father, Son, and 
Spirit,’ but such a procedure would be unhelpful. Consider the ETS’s 
confession: it is a matter of record that the requirement to be Trinitarian 
was inserted to prevent those who claimed to believe the Bible, but who 
denied the Trinity, from seeking membership. This highlights the fact 
that the word ‘Trinitarian’ has typically been used to judge the adequacy 
of various proposed readings of Scripture. Arians, Socinians, Unitarians, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Oneness Pentecostals, and various others all read 
Scripture wrongly because they fail to read it in a trinitarian way. That 
sentence only makes sense if we accept that ‘trinitarian’ means something 
more definite than merely ‘whatever I think the Bible teaches’. The claim 
‘Scripture teaches a trinitarian doctrine of God’, that is, is substantive, 
and not merely a tautology.
Perhaps a parallel example will help here: consider the word ‘Calvin-
ist’; it is similarly undefined biblically, and similarly proposes a body of 
teaching that claims to be biblical, but that others regard as a poor reading 
of Scripture (in this case, of  course, the dividing-lines are between evan-
gelical believers). Calvinists hold a particular set of ideas about fallenness, 
grace, faith, and election; they hold to these ideas because they believe 
that they are in fact taught in Scripture, but the word ‘Calvinist’ refers to 
that definite and limited set of ideas, not to whatever doctrine someone 
claims to find in Scripture. The Arminian may argue ‘The biblical doc-
trine of grace is not Calvinist’ and have something meaningful to say.
In both cases, then, there is no possible biblical challenge over the defi-
nition of the term, only over the correctness of the doctrine so denoted. Of 
course, I might challenge the definition—the claim that it is not authenti-
cally Calvinist to hold to a limited atonement is an example that has been 
essayed more than once. The only meaningful court of appeal here will be 
to history: ‘Calvinist’ describes a historical tradition that has its origins in 
the Genevan reformer, and is generally considered to find a key point of 
development in the Synod of Dort; the idea of limited atonement develops 
during that history (the first explicit articulation, I believe, was in Beza’s 
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responses to Andreae at the Montbéliard Colloquy in 15865); any argu-
ment that the idea is, or is not, authentically ‘Calvinist’ will turn on a 
telling of this history.
Mention of Dort takes me to a second point, slightly more contro-
versial: not only must we define ‘trinitarian’ historically, we cannot do it 
by simple appeal to this or that historical document. This is the thesis of 
Barnes’s decisive essay, ‘The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon’.6 It is 
at least arguable that the Canons of Dort provide a definitive account of 
what it is to be ‘Calvinist’—that argument must be historical in form, of 
course, but once made and accepted permits a certain abstraction from 
history. I do not need to know the details of the arguments surround-
ing Jacobus Arminius and Johannes Wtenbogaert (the author of the Five 
Articles of Remonstrance) to be able to determine whether a position is 
authentically Calvinist or not; I have a canon, or rather a set of Canons, to 
measure it by. My claim here is that there is no similar canon, no similar 
defining symbolic document, for trinitarianism.
This is not an obvious position, in that there are at least three appar-
ent candidates, the decrees of the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople, 
and the document we know as the Nicene Creed. It is not hard, however, to 
show that these are inadequate. The simplest summary of orthodox trini-
tarianism, the one routinely taught to first year undergraduates, goes ‘mia 
ousia, treis hypostases’. But none of our three documents teach this for-
mula. Famously, Nicaea actually anathematises all who teach more than 
one hypostasis in the Godhead;7 Constantinople, or at least that summary 
of it that has reached us, makes no mention of ousia or hypostasis at all;8 
the Creed will insist the Son is homoousios ton Patri, but says nothing 
similar of the Holy Spirit, and, again, does not use the word hypostasis at 
5 On the various arguments adduced concerning predestination there see Jill 
Raitt, The Colloquy of Montbéliard: Religion and Politics in the Sixteenth Cen-
tury (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 147-55 and Gottfried Adam, 
Der Streit um die Prädestination im ausgehenden 16. Jahrhundert: Eine Unter-
suchung zu den Entwurfen von Samuel Huber und Aegidius Hunnius (Neu-
kirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1970), pp. 29-49.
6 Michel Rene Barnes, ‘The Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon’ in Lewis 
Ayres and Gareth Jones (eds), Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric, and 
Community (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 47-67.
7 Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας … Ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσιάς φάσκοντας εἶναι … 
τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία. (From the 
Creed of Nicea)
8 The closest to a trinitarian formula comes in the fifth canon, which merely 
affirms the single deity of Father, Son, and Spirit.
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all. These documents, vital though they are, simply do not codify what we 
now call trinitarianism.
So how do we define ‘trinitarian’? Barnes’s argument in the paper cited 
above is that this core Christian doctrine is determined by the debate that, 
roughly put, occurs between Nicaea and Constantinople—I would want 
to add Augustine’s interpretation of the Nicene heritage also (which I do 
not think Barnes would deny, but it was not the focus of his argument 
then). If we are to understand what the demand to be trinitarian means, 
we need to be attentive to the fourth century debates, and to understand 
the doctrine that underlay the affirmations—and particularly the con-
demnations—made at Constantinople.
The first canon that has come down to us from that Council (one of 
the undisputed ones) affirms the faith of Nicaea and then condemns a 
series of positions by name alone. We are told that Eunomians, Arians, 
Semi-Arians, Sabellians, Marcellians, Photinians, and Apollinarians are 
all wrong. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is that teaching which 
falls into none of these errors, but it is not spelled out. This is not a sur-
prise: patristic theology tended to make progress by denying the possi-
bility of various positions. We might on this basis assert that orthodox 
trinitarianism is more of a space than a doctrine, and suggest that any 
account that does not fall foul of these various strictures can stand. There 
are two problems with this, however. The first is that it does not overcome 
the basic point that I am arguing here: even if we accept that claim com-
pletely, to determine the limits of orthodoxy we will need to discover what 
Eunomius, Sabellius, Marcellus, Photinus, and the rest taught. This will, 
inevitably, be historical work.
Second, the history is not generally read as leaving a blank space 
between these various heresies. What is left when they are all excluded is 
something quite specific and defined, which we might term Cappadocian 
trinitarianism (locating Augustine as the most capable interpreter of that 
tradition). Now, Barnes certainly suggests in the paper I have cited that 
there were two strands of presentation here: one, represented by Rome, 
Alexandria and, later, Augustine, locating Arius as the heresiarch of the 
century and interpreting later errors as different modes of repeating his 
core errors, and the other represented supremely by the Cappadocians 
seeing Arius as a fairly minor aberration, and seeing the great elenctic 
task as opposing Eunomius. There is not here, however, a difference of 
doctrine, so much as a difference over who the doctrine was to be defined 
against. Further, it is fair to say that in the two decades since Barnes wrote 
that paper there has been a massive and compelling body of patristic 
scholarship on the fourth century that has at least softened the edges of 
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this picture, and that has found the presentation of later non-nicene theol-
ogies as dependent on Arius to be a move more political than theological.9
The presenting problem for fourth-century theology was two equally 
biblical, but apparently contradictory, modes of discourse concerning the 
divine life. On the one hand, Christians, like the people of Israel, are called 
to an uncompromising loyalty to one God alone; on the other Christians 
speak of Father, Son, and Spirit as each being divine. The Constantinopo-
litan list of heresies bears witness to this: Arians, Semi-Arians, and Euno-
mians err in so stressing the diversity of Father and Son (or, in the case of 
the semi-Arians, Father and Spirit) that they deny the divine unity; Sabel-
lians, Marcellians, and Photinians err in so stressing the divine unity that 
they deny any real distinct existence of the three divine persons.
I have written at some length elsewhere10 on how these debates played 
out, and tried to delineate the careful theological moves that enable the 
Cappadocian statement of a convincing doctrine that falls into neither 
error. I do not intend to repeat that material here; but I re-iterate that this 
history, famously complex as it is, is the only available definition we have 
of what it is to be trinitarian. This does not mean, of course, that everyone 
who wishes to claim to be trinitarian must become an expert in fourth-
century doctrinal history; it does mean that when a question arises about 
what is acceptably trinitarian, then the only proper court of appeal is to a 
careful statement and consideration of this history. And so I turn to the 
novel—they are novel, as will become clear—ideas clustered around the 
slogans ‘eternal functional subordination’ (hereafter ‘EFS’) and ‘eternal 
relations of authority and submission’ (hereafter ‘ERAS’). How do these 
sorts of ideas relate to this complex and historically-defined term, ’trini-
tarian’?
The first thing we must insist is that biblical exegesis has no purchase 
on this question. This is not a surrender of biblical authority, but a con-
sequence of what I have so far argued about the term ‘trinitarian’ being 
only definable historically. Suppose I came to be convinced both that the 
Scriptures teach EFS (or ERAS), and that the position was nonetheless 
incompatible with those positions developed in the fourth century: the 
proper claim then would not be that EFS was compatible with trinitar-
ian orthodoxy, but that (so-called) trinitarian orthodoxy was unbiblical. I 
would have arrived in the position of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, or the One-
ness Pentecostals, of rejecting trinitarianism out of faithfulness to (what I 
perceived to be) the Biblical revelation. To return to my former analogy, I 
9 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitar-
ian Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2004) remains the key text here.
10 Holmes, The Holy Trinity, pp. 82-120.
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might attempt to prove that the doctrine of unconditional election is false 
from the Scriptures, but I cannot prove that it is not a proper tenet of Cal-
vinism by exegesis. In exactly the same way, I can try to prove that a posi-
tion, be it EFS, or confession of the filioque, or inseparable operations, or 
divine simplicity, is right by appeal to Scripture, but I cannot, necessarily, 
prove that a position is trinitarian by the same procedure. That judgement 
can only ever be arrived at historically.11
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOD’S ETERNAL LIFE AND GOD’S 
ACTIONS IN THE WORLD
Proposals such as EFS or ERAS, as their names suggest, are claims about 
the eternal life of God—about who God is in se. Just as the saying of the 
incarnate Son that ‘the Father is greater than I’ does not lead to Arianism 
because it reflects the state of humiliation occasioned by the incarnation, 
not the eternal equality of Father and Son, so demonstrations of an obedi-
ence or submission of the Son to the Father that refer to the Son’s state of 
humiliation are not adequate to prove an eternal subordination or sub-
mission. At one level, of course, this is uncontentious, but there is a point 
where we need to be careful: the proper distinction here is one that con-
cerns the divine life, and is between theology and economy, not one that 
concerns the Son’s state, and so is between pre-incarnate and incarnate, 
or humiliation and glorification.
This plays into the question at two points, corresponding to the begin-
ning and the end of God’s redemptive purposes. In seeking to order the 
divine works in the world using the concept of covenant, seventeenth-
century Reformed authors proposed a ‘covenant of redemption’, a pre-
temporal agreement between Father and Son (and, presumably, Spirit, 
although the point was generally left implicit) that the Son would assume 
a human nature, suffer crucifixion, and so bring salvation to the elect. 
Some have suggested that this covenant of redemption offers an example 
of an eternal, because pre-temporal, ordering in the divine life that shows 
authority and submission.12
11 For this reason I have not even attempted to engage with the many exegetical 
defences of EFS/ERAS; if adequate, they establish it as true, but not as trini-
tarian, and so they are not relevant to my modest argument here.
12 John Starke makes this error in arguing that John Owen taught an eternal 
authority of the Father over the Son; Owen is clear that this inequality stems 
from the pactum salutis, and so is not a reality of the divine life. Starke, 
‘Augustine and his interpreters’ in Ware and Starke, One God …, pp. 155-172, 
especially pp. 159-165. Tyler Wittman’s review of this volume in Themelios 40 
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The point appears powerful if we accept the reality of the pactum salu-
tis: here is an event in eternity in which the Son submits to the Father’s 
purposes. We might of course offer a rebuttal, which might take a strong 
form, that the pactum has in fact no basis in authority and submission, 
but instead results in the Father-Son relationship assuming that shape in 
the work of redemption.13 A weaker form of the same point might instead 
insist that we know nothing of the character of the covenant, and so can 
claim nothing about the divine life from it. This seems to me to be prop-
erly modest, but I think we should go further.
The pactum salutis is eternal in that it is pre-temporal, but it is not 
eternal in the sense that it belongs to the perfect life of God. It is very 
clearly the beginning of the works of God—the beginning of the great 
work of redemption. If God had chosen to remain alone in perfect eternal 
bliss and not to create, there would never have been a pactum salutis.14 
So the pactum tells us nothing about the eternal life of God (or at least 
nothing direct—I will come back to this). Similarly, the teaching of Paul 
in Corinthians that the last act of God’s saving work will be the Son’s 
handing over the Kingdom to the Father might appear to speak of an act 
of submission or subordination in eternity, but again it is, if the language 
may be allowed, the wrong eternity: it is the consummation of the divine 
work, not an aspect of the divine life.
The defender of EFS/ERAS could respond to this in two obvious ways. 
One would be to embrace a broadly Barthian account of the divine life, 
in which God’s eternal decision to be pro nobis is a determination of the 
divine life. (Famously, Barth includes the doctrine of election as the last 
(2015), pp. 350-2, demonstrates the point about Owen and the pactum effec-
tively.
13 This is in fact precisely what Owen teaches according to Wittman.
14 In the various blog posts that flowed on this issue in the summer of 2016, 
Jonathan Edwards was quoted more than once as an apparent defender of 
EFS/ERAS, but the defence relies on a failure to understand this point. The 
relevant text is Miscellanies 1062, which begins with an assertion that there 
is an economic order in the divine acts, ‘a subordination of the persons of the 
Trinity, in their actings with respect to the creature.’ Edwards immediately 
insists, however, that there can be no eternal subordination with respect to 
the divine will (i.e., no ‘authority’ or ‘submission’) and so faces a conundrum, 
which he solves by appealing to the pactum salutis: the economic subordi-
nation ‘must be conceived of as in some respect established by mutual free 
agreement…’ Edwards has more to say about the fittingness of this order, 
which I will consider below. (Quotations from the online Yale Works of Jona-
than Edwards vol. 20 (ed. Amy Plantinga Pauw).)
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word of the doctrine of God, not the first word of the works of God.15) 
Is such a move compatible with fourth-century trinitarianism? There 
are obvious problems: an apparent suggestion of change in the perfect 
divine life being chief among them, but there is also a modification, at 
least, of divine aseity. That said, some of the most interesting theological 
work being done in the USA today is pushing in this sort of direction—I 
am thinking of projects like Jenson’s and, particularly, McCormack’s.16 
Suppose one of these projects worked, and it was in fact possible to show 
that there was a way of holding on to a recognisably-orthodox account of 
immutability and aseity whilst accepting the act of election, or the pactum 
salutis, as a determination of God’s life, not just ours; would the resulting 
doctrine be adequately trinitarian?
The answer, unfortunately, must be ‘no’, for all the reasons explored 
above. Satisfying abstract doctrinal conditions is not enough to make 
a position ‘trinitarian’; rather we must be confessing the same sort of 
perfect divine life as the fourth-century fathers confessed. A Barthian 
account, although it might be attractive and even correct, is not this. If 
Barth is right about this particular aspect of the divine life, then Basil, 
Gregory and Augustine were wrong—and an account that suggests that 
Basil, Gregory, and Augustine were wrong about the divine life is, for that 
reason alone, already not adequately trinitarian on the only meaningful 
definition of ‘trinitarian’ we have.
The second obvious response would be to accept the argument above, 
that the pactum salutis belongs to the works of God, not to the perfect 
life of God, but to insist that the ordering of the works of God reflects 
the ordering of the divine life. This is much stronger. Basil of Caesarea 
insisted on this point, that because of the eternal order—taxis—of the 
divine life, all divine works are initiated by the Father, carried forward 
by the Son, and perfected by the Spirit. This suggests that orthodox trini-
tarianism recognised, indeed insisted upon, an order in the life of God 
that is reflected in a created analogue of the Father sovereignly proposing, 
and the Son apparently obediently acting in response.17 To answer this 
15 Barth, CD II/2, pp. 76-93.
16 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology vol. 1: The Triune God (Oxford: 
OUP, 1997) and Bruce L. McCormack, ‘Election and the Trinity: Theses in 
Response to George Hunsinger’ SJT 63 (2010), pp. 203-224.
17 This is Edwards’ continuation in Miscellanies 1062: there his, he suggests, ‘a 
natural decency and fitness’ to the economic ordering. This is emphatically 
not any account of ‘eternal functional subordination’: he is clear that the only 
order in the eternal life of God is the relations of origin, but because the Son is 
from the Father in all eternity, there is a fittingness in the Son freely choosing 
to accept the authority of the Father in the economy.
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point, we need to reflect on the teaching encompassed in the slogan opera 
externa trinitatis indivisa sunt. I will take up this reflection later.
THE SON, ETERNAL AND INCARNATE
Much of the worthwhile work in the fourth-century debates depended 
on clarifying the different ways in which Scripture refers to the Father-
Son relation. The basic clarification, achieved most clearly by Hilary of 
Poitiers,18 is the one I have already made, between the eternal relation and 
the relation of the Father to the incarnate Son. ‘I and the Father are one’ 
refers to the eternal relation; ‘the Father is greater than I’ to the incarnated 
relation. (Some statements—‘I have come from the Father’—are ambigu-
ous, and Augustine introduced a third category of distinction: statements 
of relationship that apply equally to the eternal life and the incarnate life 
of the Son.)
This distinction is basic to the development of fourth-century trini-
tarianism, and stands as a way of continuing to affirm the co-equal glory 
of the Father and the Son without ignoring or explaining away Biblical 
texts that speak of an unequal relationship. It becomes effectively an exe-
getical rule: whenever a text speaks of any sort of subordination of the 
Son to the Father, the text is to be read as speaking of the economy, of 
the relation of the Father to the incarnate Son. Thus the basic doctrinal 
requirement of absolute equality and simplicity is maintained.
This raises a significant problem for the defender of EFS/ERAS: there 
is a programmatic basis to orthodox trinitarianism which insists that any 
Scriptural statement of authority, submission, or subordination in the 
Father-Son relationship is understood as referring to the economy of sal-
vation, not to the eternal divine life. It is hard to see on this basis how any 
exegetical argument for EFS/ERAS can proceed without first rejecting a 
basic claim of the fourth-century trinitarian consensus. Nonetheless, let 
us press on: what can we say about the eternal Father-Son relationship 
under the strictures of classical trinitarianism?
The answer is fairly precise. All that is said of the eternal life of God 
is said of the single ousia save only that which refers to the relations of 
origin.19 Thomas Aquinas, who understood this well, suggests that there 
are therefore five things only we can know about the persons of the Trin-
ity: that the Father is unbegotten, that the Father begets the Son, that the 
Son is begotten of the Father, that the Father and the Son together spirate 
18 De Trin. IX.14.
19 This is the way I summarised the point in The Holy Trinity, see p. 146.
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the Spirit, and that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.20 This 
point is crucial to fourth-century trinitarian theology because it defends 
the core doctrine of divine simplicity.21 To surrender this point, on ortho-
dox trinitarian logic, is to deny the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit; it is to 
embrace polytheism.22
What are we going to do with EFS/ERAS under this stricture? Only 
one line is possible for the defender of these positions: to insist that in the 
relationship of begetting and being begotten there is either a functional 
subordination, or a relationship of authority and submission. This point 
has been recognised and accepted by defenders of these positions.23 Let 
me specify the issue here more carefully:
Origen offered the standard defence of eternal generation,24 a doctrine 
that of course is enshrined in the Creed. God does not change, and so the 
Son is co-eternal with the Father, and yet the Son has His origin in being 
begotten from the Father; how do we square these three necessary bibli-
cal truths? By, Origen suggests, asserting that the generation of the Son 
is not the beginning of a new relationship, but the eternal way of being 
of the Father and the Son. The Father is eternally begetting the Son; the 
Son is eternally being begotten of the Father (and, to complete the list, 
the Father and the Son are eternally spirating the Spirit, and the Spirit is 
eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son). To press forward a bit 
from Origen, this is the best description—the only description—of the 
pure act that the life of God is, a single, simple event of ecstatic, perfect, 
and loving self-donation.
I am aware that some involved in defending EFS have also denied eter-
nal generation;25 I do not have much to say about that except that to deny 
eternal generation is certainly to deny the doctrine of the Trinity, and, 
20 ST Ia q. 32 art. 3.
21 On this, see (e.g.) Ayres, Nicaea, pp. 280-1 & 286-8.
22 Gregory of Nyssa argues this point explicitly in his classic work Ad Ablab., 
often entitled in English ‘That we should not think of saying there are three 
gods’.
23 See, e.g., Wayne Grudem, ‘Doctrinal Deviations in Evangelical-Feminist 
Arguments about the Trinity’ in Ware & Starke, One God…, pp. 17-46, espe-
cially, pp. 18-32.
24 He addresses it at various points in the extant works, but see for example De 
Prin. 1.2.2. The best interpretation is probably still Peter Widdicombe, The 
Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).
25 I should note that there have been several verbal reports that two leading 
figures who have advanced this position in print, Bruce Ware and Wayne 
Grudem, indicated in public at the 2016 ETS conference that they now 
accepted the doctrine of eternal generation. I cannot yet find any published 
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given that ‘eternally begotten of the Father’ is a confession of the Nicene 
Creed, is in grave danger of departing from what can meaningfully be 
called Christianity—it is, once again, to side with Unitarians and Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses in claiming that the Christian doctrine of God is unbibli-
cal. Assuming then that the doctrine of eternal generation is accepted, if 
we are going to find an account of EFS/ERAS that is adequately Trinitar-
ian, we are going to have to find it within our confession of eternal genera-
tion, as there is nothing else we can say about the Father-Son relationship.
This ‘nothing else’ imposes a strict condition on our derivation: it 
is not just that our putative account of EFS or ERAS has to be coherent 
with eternal generation; it has to be shown to derive from that doctrine, 
because there is nothing other than eternal generation that we can say of 
the Father-Son relation. Now, this is not immediately hopeless: two lines 
suggest themselves. The first is to note that this relationship is asym-
metric. There is, as we have noted, a proper taxis, an order, to the triune 
life. Durst’s recent book is valuable both in reminding us that the Biblical 
writers feel free to order the persons in every possible way, and that these 
different orderings invite us to reflect on different aspects of God’s work 
in the world,26 but in se, in the eternal divine life, it is clearly, on the Bibli-
cal witness, proper to speak of the Father first, the Son second, and the 
Spirit third.
This asymmetry and order does not yet give us an account of authority 
or submission; it does give us an account of subordination, if that word 
is etymologically understood: the Son is second to the Father in order, 
and so is sub-ordered. This point has been routinely made by trinitarian 
theologians down the ages using language of order and suborder, a fact 
that a number of recent defenders of EFS have attempted to leverage. They 
are, unfortunately, mistaking the use of an unexceptional term for the 
embracing of a novel idea. Nothing may be derived from such usage save 
that the Son is most properly named after the Father and before the Spirit 
when we name God.27 Nonetheless, reflection on this asymmetry might 
statement to this effect, although I sincerely hope it is true, as all heaven 
rejoices when a sinner repents.
26 Rodrick K. Durst, Reordering the Trinity: Six movements of God in the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2015).
27 To take another text that was cited more than once in blog discussions in 
2016, Charles Hodge speaks of ‘a subordination’ in the Trinity (e.g. ST I.445) 
several times, but clearly means no more than this. It is ‘a subordination of 
the persons as to modes of subsistence and operation’ that is summed up 
merely in the assertion that ‘the Father is first, the Son second, and the Spirit 
third.’ (again, p. 445.)
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yet lead us to an account of authority and submission, unless there is some 
other reason to exclude such an account.
The second line we might push from the doctrine of eternal generation 
is to note that the relation between a human father and son, particularly 
in Biblical context, certainly includes authority, submission, and subordi-
nation.28 This has some prima facie plausibility: God chose to reveal the 
first and second modes of the divine being as ‘Father ‘ and ‘Son’, and so we 
are certainly invited to reflect on what we know of human paternal-filial 
relationships and to enquire whether we may predicate this of the eternal 
divine relationship also.
At the end of our investigation of what classical trinitarianism has to 
say about the Father-Son relationship, then, we are left with two possi-
ble lines for the defender of some form of EFS/ERAS, one based around 
the ordering of the indivisible divine acts, which might be held to reflect 
an order in the eternal divine life, and the other inviting a reflection on 
Father-Son language, which might be held to suggest that eternal genera-
tion is a relationship of authority and submission. To test these further, 
we turn to what we must say of the ousia, the single, simple, divine life, in 
order to be faithful to fourth-century trinitarianism.
THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE LIFE
Let me return first to the doctrine of the indivisibility of divine acts, 
which I discussed a little above. I have argued elsewhere29 that this is in 
fact a crucial doctrine for the development of Cappadocian trinitarian-
ism, particularly in Gregory of Nyssa’s much-anthologised ad Ablabium. 
Why should we not say Father, Son, and Spirit are three gods, asks Greg-
ory? His answer turns on the inseparability of divine operations: Father, 
Son, and Spirit do one thing, and so are one being. Now, this argument 
is complex in its construction, and relies on a whole set of assumptions 
which Gregory does not stop to spell out. In the essay just referenced, I 
try to do some of this work, and suggest that the inseparability of divine 
saving acts is a corollary, and so a revelation, of the simplicity of the eter-
nal divine life.
The arguments we have already seen point to a proper ordering in that 
simplicity, and here we get into the places where our language strains to 
speak well of God’s life. God is pure act, the single, simple eternal act of 
the begetting of the Son by the Father and the proceeding of the Spirit 
28 A point Wayne Grudem has pressed several times in this discussion.
29 Stephen R. Holmes, ‘Trinitarian Action and Inseparable Operations’ in 
F. Sanders & O. Crisp (eds) Advancing Trinitarian Theology: Proceedings of 
the Los Angeles Theology Conference (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015).
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from the Father and the Son. That is certainly to say that the relational 
distinctions that define the divine simplicity have a proper order to 
them—we most properly name God as the dominical baptismal formula 
does, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father is unbegotten, the Son is 
eternally begotten of the Father, the Spirit proceeds from the Father and 
the Son, and so there is a taxis, an order, in the eternal divine life. This, 
I take it, is the eternal analogue to the order we found in the insepara-
ble divine acts, but there is no hint here yet of subordination, authority, 
or submission. This is the point made by Edwards:30 the shape of triune 
acts in the economy reflects the order of being in all eternity, but does 
not imply anything more than an order, that the Father is most properly 
named first, the Son second, and the Spirit third.
Further, this order is never division. The pure act that God is is single 
and simple. As we have seen, the confession of divine simplicity is cru-
cial to fourth-century trinitarianism, and so is a confession that is neces-
sary for a theology to be adequately trinitarian.31 Now, divine simplicity 
demands the singularity of divine will, divine energy, divine action, and 
every other aspect of the divine life save only the eternal relations of ori-
gin.32 There is one volitional inclination in the divine life, one intention, 
one activity, and so on. So, any proposal suggesting some form of EFS or 
ERAS must be consistent with there being a single divine act and a single 
divine will. 
However, diversity of function requires diversity of act: this seems 
clear enough. Therefore, to hold to any form of functional differentiation, 
whether subordinationist or some other kind, within a single divine act 
is surely impossible; it would require an account of how two (or, in fact, 
three) different functions can exist within the same single and simple 
act.33 There is an eternal analogue of the order of divine acts in the world, 
30 See nn. 13 and 16 above.
31 See again Ayres, Nicaea, pp. 286-8.
32 I take it that this is obvious, but it is spelt out by John of Damascus De fid. 
orth. 8, and see now the exposition in Charles C. Twombly, Perichoresis and 
Personhood: God, Christ, and Salvation in John of Damascus (Eugene: Pick-
wick, 2015), pp. 29-32.
33 Grudem appears to realise and accept this impossibility, and so devotes space 
to insisting the doctrine of inseparable operations is unbiblical; unfortu-
nately, this defence falls foul of my basic argument in this paper: rejecting the 
ecumenical doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of a proposed private interpre-
tation of Scripture is, once again, to side with Jehovah’s Witnesses and others 
who have left the church on the grounds that the received doctrine of the 
Trinity is unbiblical. See Wayne Grudem, ‘Doctrinal Deviations…’ pp. 18-27; 
Grudem focuses upon problems he perceives in the constructions of Erick-
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but it is in the order of relations of origin, and not otherwise. There is no 
space here for an account of EFS/ERAS, or for anything similar.
To assert relations of authority and submission within a single divine 
will is similarly impossible: authority and submission require a diversity 
of volitional faculties. Where there is one simple single will, there can nec-
essarily be no authority or submission. This would appear to close off the 
second option outlined above for defending EFS/ERAS, that of an appeal 
to the language of ‘Father’ and ‘Son’. When we consider what we know 
of the divine life we are required to insist that the authority and submis-
sion we find in human paternal-filial relationships is not an analogue of 
anything real in the divine life; the language of Father and Son points to 
an asymmetrical relationship of origin and nothing more; it cannot be 
grounds for asserting EFS/ERAS, because to do so would be to offend 
against other necessary trinitarian claims, particularly divine simplicity.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the central Trinitarian doctrine of divine simplic-
ity necessarily excludes any meaningful account of subordination, or of 
authority and submission, and so there is no space for an account of EFS, 
ERAS, or anything similar, within any recognisably orthodox trinitari-
anism. I have accepted repeatedly that the defender of EFS/ERAS might 
choose, perhaps out of a desire to be faithful to his/her particular inter-
pretation of Scripture, to hold to these doctrines by rejecting orthodox 
trinitarianism, but such a rejection entails locating oneself outside of what 
is commonly understood to be the Christian church—hence my running 
comparison with Unitarianism and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. It may be 
that EFS/ERAS is biblical and correct, but if it is, the classical Christians 
tradition of ‘orthodox trinitarianism’ must inevitably be unbiblical and 
wrong.
son, Sumner, and Belleville, which in some cases do appear to be genuine 
problems, but the logic of his argument seems to require him to reject the 
doctrine of inseparable operations entirely, not merely to reject certain forms 
of it. There is an attempted retrieval on p. 24, where Grudem accepts that ‘in 
some sense we only understand very faintly’ the whole Godhead is involved 
in every divine act; he denies however that this means ‘any action done by 
one person is also done by the other two persons’, a line I find very difficult 
to make any sense of. The most natural reading would be that Grudem thinks 
the ‘whole being of God’ is something other than the three persons, but this 
would be merely bizarre.
